Prospect, benefits and dangers of expansion of the CISG - the case study of prescription by Hayward, Benjamin
  
 
 
 
 
Hayward, Benjamin 2016, Prospect, benefits and dangers of expansion of the CISG - the case study of 
prescription. In Schwenzer, Ingeborg and Spagnolo, Lisa (eds), Growing the CISG : 6th MAA 
Schlechtriem CISG conference, Eleven International Publishing, The Hague, The Netherlands, pp.21-42. 
 
 
This is the Author Accepted Version. 
 
©2016, The Author 
 
Reproduced by Deakin University with the kind permission of the copyright owner and Eleven 
International Publishing.  
 
 
 
 
Available from Deakin Research Online: 
 
33TUhttp://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30084315U33T 
3 Prospect, Benefits and Dangers of
Expansion of the CISG – The Case Study
of Prescription
Benjamin Hayward*
3.1 Introduction
The text of the CISG has remained unchanged since the time of its conclusion on 11 April
1980, and its coming into force on 1 January 1988. Nevertheless, the CISG’s text should
not be considered divorced from all other context. The CISG represents a key milestone
along a much broader path towards the harmonization and unification of international
sales law,1 commonly understood to have its origins in the 1920s with the work of Ernst
Rabel and the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT).2
Furthermore, the CISG itself is subject to development even though its text remains
unchanged. It is applied by courts and tribunals,3 and is the subject of commentary4 and
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campus of the Deakin Law School and is the Coach of Deakin University’s Willem C. Vis International
Commercial Arbitration Moot and Vis (East) Moot teams. The author would like to thank Nicola Morris
for her excellent research assistance in the preparation of this chapter. Any errors remain the author’s own.
1 J. Felemegas, ‘The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Article 7
and Uniform Interpretation’, Pace International Law Review, 2002, pp. 157-158.
2 I. Schwenzer, P. Hachem & C. Kee, Global Sales and Contract Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012,
p. 35, para. 3.08; P. Schlechtriem & I. Schwenzer, ‘Introduction’, in I. Schwenzer (Ed.), Schlechtriem &
Schwenzer: Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 3rd edition, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 1.
3 See, e.g., Pace Law School, Country Case Schedule, Albert H. Kritzer CISG Database, available at
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/casecit.html>; UNCITRAL, Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT),
available at <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_law.html>; Global Sales Law, CISG-Online.ch, available
at <http://www.globalsaleslaw.org/index.cfm?pageID=28>; UNCITRAL, Digest of Case Law on the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 2012, available at <http://www.uncitral.
org/pdf/english/clout/CISG-digest-2012-e.pdf>; UNILEX, Cases on CISG, available at <http://www.unilex.
info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2376&dsmid=13352>.
4 See, e.g., Pace Law School, Selected Archives: Full-Texts of Scholarly Writings on the CISG and the UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the Principles of European Contract Law, available at
<http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/bib2.html>; UNILEX, Bibliography, available at <http://www.unilex.
info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2376&dsmid=13357>. See also UNCITRAL, Bibliography of Recent Writings
Relating to the Work of UNCITRAL, available at <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/ publications/bibliog-
raphy_consolidated.html>.
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other expert analysis,5 all of which assist our understanding of this instrument’s operation.
In some cases, this development has successfully adapted the CISG to the changing times.6
Transactions which could not have been foreseen at the time of its conclusion, such as the
sale of software, have been dealt with under the CISG’s existing text;7 as has the conclusion
of contracts through electronic communications.8 In this sense, the CISG is (as described
by Castellani) “a work in progress”.9 Though its own text is settled, its application (and
thus the harmonization of private law) continues to develop and evolve.
On 2 May 2012, a further stage in that development was reached, with the Government
of Switzerland submitting a proposal to the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) ahead of its 45th session “in support of future work in the area
of international contract law”.10 This proposal – soon to be known as the Swiss Proposal
– raised the question as to whether the time may be right for UNCITRAL to consider further
work in the harmonization of international contract law beyond that effected through the
CISG.11 The Swiss Proposal has generated significant scholarly analysis12 – with strong
views expressed in both directions13 – and has also been discussed in the legal press.14 And
given its pedigree, it is worthy of that attention. Switzerland is a leading international
5 See, e.g., CISG Advisory Council, Welcome to the CISG Advisory Council, available at <http://www.cisgac.com>.
At the time of writing, the Council has 16 Opinions indexed on its website, alongside two Declarations, as
well as four additional as-yet-unnumbered Opinions as part of its pending Schedule of Work.
6 Compare I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem, ‘Article 7’, in I. Schwenzer (Ed.), Schlechtriem & Schwenzer: Commentary
on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 3rd edition, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 2010, p. 122, para. 5.
7 See, Landgericht München I, Germany, 8 February 1995, HG 980472, available at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/950208g4.html>; Handelsgerich Zürich, Switzerland, 17 February 2000, available at <http://cisgw3.
law.pace.edu/cases/000217s1.html>. See also I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem, ‘Article 1’, in I. Schwenzer (Ed.),
Schlechtriem & Schwenzer: Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG),
3rd edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, pp. 35-36, para. 18.
8 Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, supra note 2, p. 5.
9 See L. Castellani, ‘Foreword’, in I. Schwenzer & L. Spagnolo (Eds.), State of Play, Eleven International Pub-
lishing, The Hague, 2011, p. x.
10 UNCITRAL Secretariat, Possible Future Work in the Area of International Contract Law – Proposal by
Switzerland on Possible Future Work by UNCITRAL in the Area of International Contract Law – Note by the
Secretariat, UN GAOR, 45th session, UN Doc. A/CN.9/758, 8 May 2012, p. 1, para. 1.
11 Id., Ann. 1, p. 2.
12 See, e.g., Symposium, ‘Assessing the CISG and Other International Endeavours to Unify International
Contract Law: Has the Time Come for a New Global Initiative to Harmonize and Unify International Trade?’,
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 58, 2013.
13 See, e.g., I. Schwenzer, Who Needs a Uniform Contract Law, and Why?, paper presented at – NYSBA Hanoi
Conference (24 October 2013), pp. 5-6. Contra K. Loken, ‘A New Global Initiative on Contract Law in
UNCITRAL: Right Project, Right Forum?’, Villanova Law Review, Vol. 58, 2013, pp. 509-510; US Department
of State, Annual Meeting, 11 October 2012, available at <http://www.state.gov/s/l/202742.htm>.
14 See ‘Switzerland Proposes Future Work by UNCITRAL on International Contract Law’, European Private
Law News, 18 May 2012, available at <http://www.epln.law.ed.ac.uk/2012/05/18/switzerland-proposes-future-
work-by-uncitral-on-international-contract-law>.
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commercial law jurisdiction. It is world renowned as an attractive arbitral seat;15 its private
law is often the subject of party choice as a neutral law;16 its private international law has
influenced law reform processes around the world;17 it is a key jurisdiction in the develop-
ment of CISG jurisprudence;18 and the University of Basel hosts the Chair of Professor Dr
Schwenzer, the scope and value of whose contributions to the law of international sales
need no elaboration.19 The Swiss Proposal is also worthy of attention given that the harmo-
nization and unification of private law is a task requiring enormous effort. This is well
demonstrated by the extensive work underpinning the CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles,
reflected within their legislative histories.20
The Swiss Proposal is another milestone along the same, longer road towards the har-
monization and unification of private law, upon which the CISG also sits. The process is
one of persistent, sometimes incremental, but continual growth.
3.2 Growing the CISG, and Expansion of the CISG
The CISG, with its as-yet-unchanged text, has the potential to be “grown” along several
different dimensions. It can first be grown geographically, through its adoption by new
Member States. The CISG has consistently grown in this respect since entering into force
15 G. Born, International Commercial Arbitration, 2nd edition, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2014,
pp. 145-147; L. Mistelis, ‘Arbitral Seats – Choices and Competition’, in S. Kröll et al. (Eds.), International
Arbitration and International Commercial Law: Synergy, Convergence and Evolution, Kluwer Law International,
The Hague, 2011, p. 379. See also International Chamber of Commerce, ‘2012 Statistical Report’, ICC Bulletin,
Vol. 24, No. 1, 2013, p. 14; International Chamber of Commerce, ‘2011 Statistical Report’, ICC Bulletin, Vol.
23, No. 1, 2012, p. 13.
16 International Chamber of Commerce, ‘2012 Statistical Report’, supra note 15, p. 13; International Chamber
of Commerce, ‘2011 Statistical Report’, supra note 15, p. 14. See, e.g., International Chamber of Commerce,
Case No. 7565/1994, ICC Bulletin, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1995, p. 64. See also P. Ostendorf, International Sales Terms,
2nd edition, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2014, pp. XIV-XV, 4, paras. 7, 5-6, 12-13. Compare C. Fountoulakis,
‘The Parties’ Choice of “Neutral Law” in International Sales Contracts’, European Journal of Law Reform,
Vol. 7, 2005, pp. 307-308, 311.
17 For example, the concept of characteristic performance – see Art. 4(2) Rome Convention; Arts. 4(1) and
(2)(b) Rome I Regulation; M. Giuliano & P. Lagarde, ‘Report on the Convention on the Law Applicable to
Contractual Obligations’, OJC, 1980, pp. 20, paras. 3, 46, n. 38; L. Collins (Ed.), Dicey, Morris and Collins
on the Conflict of Laws, 15th edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2012, pp. 1822-1823, para. 32-076.
18 See, generally, Pace Law School, supra note 3, recording 212 Swiss decisions.
19 See, e.g., Schwenzer et al., supra note 2; Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, supra note 2.
20 For just one of many examples with respect to each – UNCITRAL Secretary-General, Analysis of Comments
and Proposals by Governments and International Organizations on the Draft Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, and on Draft Provisions Concerning Implementation, Reservations and Other
Final Clauses (21 February 1980), para. II.A.2.a, available at <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/Fdraft.html>;
UNIDROIT Secretariat, Working Group for the Preparation of Principles of International Commercial Contracts
– Summary Records of the Meeting Held in Rome – 4 to 7 June 2001, p. 1, paras. 1-2.
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on 1 January 1988.21 25 years after entering into force, in 2013, Brazil and Bahrain both
joined the community of Contracting States with the CISG taking effect in those jurisdic-
tions on 1 April 2014 and 1 October 2014 respectively.22 The United Kingdom’s position
is the subject of ongoing analysis,23 and is discussed in this volume in the chapter con-
tributed by Professor Dr Andersen. Other jurisdictions of interest in the CISG’s geograph-
ical growth include Vietnam, the Philippines and the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region of the People’s Republic of China – all of which are also the subject of contributions
in this volume.
CISG growth can secondly be achieved by its uptake in industry sectors where its full
potential may not previously have been realized. Article 6 CISG enshrines, subject to only
minimal limitations,24 parties’ rights to derogate from, vary, or exclude the CISG’s effect.
Professor Dr Zeller’s contribution considers commodities trade as an area of potential
growth; the CISG’s appropriateness to govern commodity sales historically being a matter
of debate.
These two dimensions of growth both result in expansion of the CISG’s operation, on
the basis of a text that itself remains stable. A third dimension of growth, directly implicated
by the Swiss Proposal, would expand the CISG through expanding its text and in particular
expanding the legal subject-matters with which that text is concerned. It is this dimension
of growth, and this conceptualisation of expansion, which is the primary concern of this
chapter.
In particular, in addressing this dimension of growth, this chapter’s focus is on the
feasibility of reform from a primarily legal perspective. Attention is given to the prospect,
benefits and dangers of expanding the CISG’s subject-matter scope, and these three cate-
gories of consideration are used as an organising framework. This chapter is not concerned
with assessing matters of need or demand. Some consideration has already been given to
these issues elsewhere25 and moreover any assessment of demand must necessarily be based
on data rather than guesswork or assumptions.26 While matters of need and demand are
undoubtedly important considerations – international commercial law being a tool designed
21 See, generally, UNCITRAL, Status – United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods (Vienna, 1980), 2015, available at <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/
1980CISG_status.html>. See also Castellani, supra note 9, p. viii.
22 UNCITRAL, supra note 21.
23 See, e.g., E. Simos, ‘The CISG: A Lost Cause in the UK?’, Vindobona Journal of International Commercial
Law & Arbitration, Vol. 16, 2012; S. Moss, ‘Why the United Kingdom Has Not Ratified the CISG’, Journal
of Law & Commerce, Vol. 25, 2005-2006.
24 See Arts. 12 and 96 CISG. See also U. Schroeter, ‘Freedom of Contract: Comparison Between Provisions of
the CISG (Article 6) and Counterpart Provisions of the PECL’, Vindobona Journal of International Commercial
Law & Arbitration, Vol. 6, 2002, p. 261.
25 See, e.g., Loken, supra note 13, p. 510.
26 M. Doris, ‘Promising Options, Dead Ends and the Reform of Australian Contract Law’, Legal Studies, Vol.
34, 2014, pp. 25, 28-29.
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to serve commercial parties27 – they are not within the scope of the analysis conducted on
this occasion.
3.3 Prospect, Benefits and Dangers Illustrated – The Case Study of
Prescription
This paper’s analysis of expanding or “growing” the CISG by the inclusion of new legal
subject-matters is organized around the case study of prescription. While different termi-
nology is used in different legal systems, and while sometimes that different terminology
reflects actual differences in the law,28 this chapter uses “prescription” as a term synonymous
with “time bars”, “the limitation of actions”, “statutes of limitation” and “limitation periods”.
Acknowledging that this terminology is being used at a relatively high level of generalisation,
the essence of prescription is taken to be the setting of an identified period of time within
which proceedings for a particular cause of action must be commenced.29 Prescription has
been identified as a key component of the harmonization of international sales law,
essential to that harmonization becoming “truly complete”.30 The reason why prescription
is a particularly interesting case study for the purposes of this chapter is that this single
subject-matter is a very good illustration of several implications which might arise from
an expansion of the CISG’s subject-matter scope. While these implications are not
exhaustive and are not necessarily even representative, the implications illustrated by the
prescription case study combine to give an interesting insight into the prospect, benefits
and dangers of expanding the CISG in this way.
This chapter’s case study is also concerned only with prescription “proper”, and not
other kinds of time limit rules falling under the umbrella of déchéance. These rules are
distinct from prescription31 and concern time limits for the giving of various kinds of
notice. Prescription, being concerned with the institution of proceedings, necessarily
implicates its own particular policy considerations.32 Examples of déchéance can include
27 E. Brödermann, ‘The Growing Importance of the UNIDROIT Principles in Europe – A Review in Light of
Market Needs, the Role of Law and the 2005 Rome I Proposal’, Uniform Law Review, Vol. 11, 2006, pp. 749,
756-757. See also Castellani, supra note 9, p. ix.
28 K. Sono, The Limitation Convention: The Forerunner to Establish UNCITRAL Credibility, Albert H. Kritzer
CISG Database, 2003, para. I.A, available at <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/sono3.html>. See,
e.g., McKain v. RW Miller & Co (South Australia) Pty Ltd (1991) 174 CLR 1, High Court, Australia,
19 December 1991, p. 41.
29 B. Garner (Ed.), Black’s Law Dictionary, West Publishing Company, St. Paul, 2009, p. 1302.
30 Sono, supra note 28, para. V.
31 See, e.g., I. Schwenzer, ‘Article 39’, in I. Schwenzer (Ed.), Schlechtriem & Schwenzer: Commentary on the UN
Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 3rd edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010,
p. 637, para. 28.
32 See, generally, Singapore Academy of Law, ‘Report of the Law Reform Committee on Limitation Periods in
Private International Law’, 2011, pp. 15-16, para. 47; South African Law Reform Commission, Prescription
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time limits for giving notice of defects or notice of termination,33 and such requirements
may come from an applicable law or the parties’ agreement.34 As they have a distinct legal
character, “more aptly dealt with in relation to the rights and claims arising from a sales
contract”,35 they are not dealt with by existing international instruments regulating pre-
scription.36 They are similarly not within the scope of the analysis in this chapter.
3.3.1 The Prospect of Change – The (Still) Uncertain Boundaries of the CISG
The first implication raised by the case study of prescription – considered by this paper as
a matter of potential change – are the (still) uncertain boundaries of the CISG.
It is a well-established and uncontroversial feature of the CISG that the instrument is
not a comprehensive code that regulates all legal issues that might possibly arise out of an
international sale of goods.37 That was never the drafters’ intentions;38 instead the CISG’s
subject-matter scope was intentionally limited.39 It is thus said to embrace an eclectic model
of regulation, having non-monopolistic pretensions40 – the CISG governs those matters
within its subject-matter scope, leaving other issues to be determined according to the
otherwise applicable law.41
This feature of the CISG is effected in practice by three aspects of its architecture – the
rules set out in Articles 4, 5 and 7(2) CISG. These provisions collectively establish the
Periods – Discussion Paper No. 126 – Project 125, 2011, pp. 11-13, paras. 3.1-3.10; Note, ‘Developments in
the Law – Statutes of Limitations’, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 63, 1949-1950, pp. 1185-1186; Brisbane South
Regional Health Authority v. Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541, High Court, Australia, 2 October 1996, pp. 551-
553.
33 K. Sono, ‘Commentary on the Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods, Done
at New York 14 June 1974 (A/CONF.63/17)’, Yearbook of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law, Vol. X, 1979, p. 149, para. 8.
34 Sono, supra note 28, para. IV.A. See also P. Winship, ‘The Convention on the Limitation Period in the
International Sale of Goods: The United States Adopts UNCITRAL’s Firstborn’, International Lawyer, Vol.
28, 1994, pp. 1078-1079.
35 Sono, supra note 28, para. IV.A.
36 Regarding the Limitation Period Convention – Art. 1(2) Limitation Period Convention; Sono, supra note
33, p. 149, para. 8; Winship, supra note 34, p. 1079; Sono, supra note 28, para. IV.A. Regarding the UNIDROIT
Principles 2010 – Art. 10.1(2) UNIDROIT Principles 2010; Art. 10.1 Commentary UNIDROIT Principles
2010, para. 2.
37 I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem, ‘Article 4’, in I. Schwenzer (Ed.), Schlechtriem & Schwenzer: Commentary on the
UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 3rd edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
2010, p. 75, para. 2.
38 UNCITRAL Secretariat, ‘Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods’ UN Doc A/CONF.97/5 (14 March 1979), Art. 4, para. 1.
39 F. De Ly, ‘Sources of International Sales Law: An Eclectic Model’, Journal of Law & Commerce, Vol. 25,
2005-2006, pp. 2-3.
40 Id., p. 3.
41 See, e.g., CIETAC, September 2004, Award 0291-1/2004, paras. 13.3, 16.16.2-16.16.3, available at <http://www.
unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=2&do=case&id=1441&step=FullText>.
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CISG’s subject-matter boundaries, and also the (differing) methodologies for resolving
disputes over the legal rules applicable for matters sitting on either side of those boundaries.
Article 5 CISG limits the subject-matters with which the Convention deals by providing
that it “does not apply to the liability of the seller for death or personal injury caused by
the goods to any person”. Article 4 CISG, described as the Convention’s “table of contents”42
and the “guide-post” to its application,43 further identifies the outer boundary of the CISG.44
It identifies that the formation of contracts, and the rights and obligations of the parties,
are the matters with which the CISG deals. It also expressly identifies a number of issues
that are not governed, unless dealt with expressly by its provisions, being the validity of
contracts, and the contract’s effect on the passage of property.45 However, by implication,
this list is illustrative only rather than exhaustive and it is in fact all matters not characterized
as formation or rights / obligations issues that are outside the CISG’s scope46 (unless, as
noted in Article 4 CISG, the CISG otherwise provides).47
There is no particular rule contained in the CISG for identifying the law governing
matters outside this Article 4 CISG subject-matter scope. However, as explained by the
late Professor Dr Schlechtriem (in whose honour this contribution is made), it is necessarily
the case that this law be identified by the rules of private international law applied by the
state court resolving a particular case.48 In the case of arbitration, the relevant private
international law methodology would be set out in the parties’ chosen arbitration rules49
or otherwise the seat’s lex arbitri.50 For matters inside the Article 4 CISG subject-matter
scope but not the subject of a particular rule, Article 7(2) CISG provides that private
international law is only resorted to in the second instance, after one first searches for a
42 A. Kazimierska, ‘The Remedy of Avoidance Under the Vienna Convention on the International Sale of
Goods’, in Pace International Law Review (Ed.), Pace Review of the Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods 1999 – 2000, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2000, p. 156.
43 W. Khoo, ‘Article 4’, in C.M. Bianca & M.J. Bonell (Eds.), Commentary on the International Sales Law,
Giuffrè, Milan, 1987, p. 46, para. 3.1.
44 Kazimierska, supra note 42, p. 156.
45 Arts. 4(a) and (b) CISG.
46 Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 37, pp. 75-76, para. 3; H. Flechtner, ‘Selected Issues Relating to the CISG’s
Scope of Application’, Vindobona Journal of International Commercial Law & Arbitration, Vol. 13, 2009, p.
99. See also Khoo, supra note 43, p. 45, para. 2.4.
47 See, e.g., Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 37, pp. 75, para. 2, 88 para. 29.
48 P. Schlechtriem, ‘Requirements of Application and Sphere of Applicability of the CISG’, Victoria University
of Wellington Law Review, Vol. 36, 2005, p. 788. See also Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 37, p. 77, para.
6; Khoo, supra note 43, p. 46, para. 3.1.
49 See, e.g., Art. 33(1) Swiss Rules of International Arbitration 2012 – the closest connection test; Art. 21(1)
ICC Rules 2012 – the voie directe. Contra Paris Rules 2013 – no relevant provision.
50 See, e.g., Art. 187(1) Swiss Private International Law Act 1987 – the closest connection test; Art. 1511 French
Arbitration Law 2011 – the voie directe; Art. 28(2) Model Law 2006 – the voie indirecte. Contra Swedish
Arbitration Act 1999 – no relevant provision.
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solution based on the CISG’s general principles.51 The literature and case law has identified
a number of those general principles,52 though some are noted as controversial.53 The lit-
erature reflects these two different methodologies, applicable to the rules sought to be
identified on either side of the Article 4 CISG perimeter, through the language of “external
gaps” and “internal gaps” (respectively).54
These propositions are simple enough to state.55 However, if one is to put aside the
question as to exactly which principles qualify as general principles for the purposes of
Article 7(2) CISG, there are still today some fundamental questions remaining over the
precise point at which the Article 4 CISG line between external gaps and internal gaps is
drawn.56 This is not merely an academic point, as the side of this “tightrope”57 that a matter
falls upon will determine the methodology that the CISG requires to be applied in finding
the solution. Matters that have been the subject of debate include penalty clauses,58 and
the award of attorneys’ fees.59 Another particularly interesting area of analysis is whether
the CISG’s subject-matter scope would include arbitration agreements,60 treated at law as
51 J. Lookofsky, ‘Walking the Article 7(2) Tightrope between CISG and Domestic Law’, Journal of Law &
Commerce, Vol. 25, 2005-2006, pp. 88-90. See, e.g., Foreign Trade Court of Arbitration attached to the Serbian
Chamber of Commerce, 19 October 2009, T-6/08, para. VI.3.2, available at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/
091019sb.html>.
52 See, e.g., Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 6, pp. 135-139, paras. 31-36.
53 See, e.g., Lookofsky, supra note 51, p. 89, regarding estoppel.
54 See, e.g., Flechtner, supra note 46, p. 93.
55 Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 6, p. 134, para. 28. See also Khoo, supra note 43, p. 45, para. 2.1.
56 Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 6, p. 134, para. 28; Lookofsky, supra note 51, p. 90. See also Khoo, supra
note 43, p. 46, para. 3.2.
57 Lookofsky, supra note 51, p. 90.
58 F. Mohs & B. Zeller, ‘Penalty and Liquidated Damages Clauses in CISG Contracts Revisited’, Mealey’s
International Arbitration Report, Vol. 21, No. 6, 2006, pp. 1-2; P. Koneru, ‘The International Interpretation
of the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: An Approach Based on General
Principles’, Minn J Global Trade, Vol. 6, 1997, pp. 141-145. See also P. Hachem, ‘Fixed Sums in CISG Con-
tracts’, Vindobona Journal of International Commercial Law & Arbitration, Vol. 13, 2009, pp. 219-220, 222-
228.
59 Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 37, pp. 94-95, para. 48. See, generally, B. Zeller, ‘Attorneys’ Fees – Last
Ditch Stand?’, Vill LR, Vol. 58, 2013. See also Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, supra note 2, pp. 7-8, para. 1;
Flechtner, supra note 46, pp. 107-108; CISG Advisory Council, ‘Opinion No. 6 – Calculation of Damages
Under CISG Article 74’, 2006, Rapporteur: Professor John Y. Gotanda, paras. 5, 5.1-5.4; Zapata Hermanos
Sucesores SA v. Hearthside Baking Company Inc, Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, United States of
America, 19 November 2002, available at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021119u1.html>.
60 See, generally, I. Schwenzer & D. Tebel, ‘The Word is Not Enough – Arbitration, Choice of Forum and
Choice of Law Clauses Under the CISG’, ASA Bull, Vol. 31, 2013. See also P. Perales Viscasillas & D. Ramos
Muñoz, ‘CISG & Arbitration’, in A. Büchler & M. Müller-Chen (Eds.), Private Law: National – Global –
Comparative, Festschrift für Ingeborg Schwenzer zum 60 Gerburtstag, 2011, pp. 1360-1369, 1373.
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independent contracts pursuant to the doctrine variously known as separability, severability
or autonomy61 and which is said to form “part of the very alphabet of arbitration law”.62
The CISG’s boundaries are implicated by this chapter’s prescription case study as a
matter of prospective change because the weight of authority treating the matter as outside
the CISG’s scope is so heavy that the Schlechtriem & Schwenzer Commentary describes the
view as “unanimously held”.63 The very existence of UNCITRAL’s “firstborn”,64 the Limi-
tation Period Convention, is evidence of this – and in particular, Article 39 CISG is an
example of déchéance rather than prescription.65 Nevertheless, a very small selection of
authorities do not share this view. In Traction Levage SA v. Drako Drahtseilerei Gustav
Kocks GmbH,66 an English language abstract of which is reported as CLOUT Case No. 482,
it was held that prescription is governed by but not settled in the CISG, and private inter-
national law was then applied by the cour d’appel Paris through Article 7(2) CISG to seek
a solution. If an internal gap methodology is applied, the first stage of enquiry pursuant
to Article 7(2) CISG must be to seek an answer through an application of the CISG’s general
principles. At least one commentator has argued that a solution to prescription internal
to the CISG might be derived on this basis.67 This alternative (though minority) view raises
a matter of prospect for the CISG’s expansion to include express rules on prescription.
The way in which a legislative solution might be sought out (based on the CISG’s existing
internal and external gap architecture established by Articles 4 and 7(2) CISG) would differ
depending on the point of departure. On the majority view – the task involves negotiating
international law reform to create a new harmonized solution. On the minority alternative
view – it might first involve an attempt to articulate a uniform solution already inherent
(but remaining unexpressed) within the CISG’s general principles.
61 E. Gaillard & J. Savage (Eds.), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer
Law International, The Hague, 1999, p. 198, para. 389; P. Landolt, ‘The Inconvenience of Principle: Separa-
bility and Kompetenz-Kompetenz’, Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 30, 2013, p. 513.
62 Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v. Impregilo SpA [2005] UKHL 43, House of Lords, United
Kingdom, 30 June 2005, p. 232, para. 21.
63 Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 37, pp. 95, para. 50. See also Schwenzer, supra note 31, pp. 637-638, paras.
28-29.
64 Winship, supra note 34, p. 1072.
65 Id., p. 1079; Sono, supra note 28, para. IV.A. See, generally, CISG Advisory Council, ‘Opinion No. 2 –
Examination of the Goods and Notice of Non-Conformity – Articles 38 and 39’, 2004, Rapporteur: Professor
Eric E. Bergsten,
66 Cour d’appel Paris, France, 6 November 2001, Traction Levage SA v. Drako Drahtseilerei Gustav Kocks
GmbH, available at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/011106f1.html>.
67 A. Williams, ‘Limitations on Uniformity in International Sales Law: A Reasoned Argument for the Application
of a Standard Limitation Period Under the Provisions of the CISG’, Vindobona Journal of International
Commercial Law & Arbitration, Vol. 10, 2006, pp. 244-259.
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3.3.2 The Prospect of Change – The Widely Diverging State Laws on
Prescription
A second implication raised by the prescription case study is the way in which expansion
of the CISG’s subject-matter scope might be achieved in the face of widely diverging state
laws. As noted by Paulsson, it might seem a “disabused quip”, but there is truth in the
observation that treaties are “disagreement[s] reduced to writing”.68 Existing state law
represents the status quo from which harmonized law is constructed; the CISG’s existing
text is said to balance common law and civil law perspectives69 within a framework of
neutral70 and readily understood terminology.71 Existing state law also represents the non-
harmonized solution eventually displaced by an expanded CISG. Prescription is “a complex
subject”72 and there are well-documented and significant differences between state laws.73
These are reflected in conflict of laws disputes that state court judges and arbitrators alike
have been required to resolve.
The length of time permitted for the bringing of an action is the most obvious aspect
of existing prescription laws that might differ between states. It can differ within states,
with Swiss law providing an example of different prescription periods applying to different
types of contractual claim.74 It can even differ between separate provinces inside a single
state, with all (internal) states and territories of Australia adopting six year prescription
periods for contract claims75 except for the Northern Territory, which has adopted a three
year statute.76 It is not infrequently observed in the literature that the times permitted
amongst various jurisdictions range from six months to thirty years,77 with the Conconut
68 J. Paulsson, ‘Scholarship as Law’, in M. Arsanjani et al. (Eds.), Looking to the Future – Essays on International
Law in Honor of W. Michael Reisman, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2011, p. 186. See also C. Lamb, ‘International
Treaties and Conventions’, AMPLA Bull, Vol. 15, 1996, pp. 23-27.
69 Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, supra note 2, p. 6.
70 J. Felemegas, ‘Introduction’, in J. Felemegas (Ed.), An International Approach to the Interpretation of the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980) as Uniform Sales Law,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, pp. 20-22. Compare Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 6, p.
123, para 8.
71 UNCITRAL Secretariat, ‘Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods’, 2010, para.13. Compare Castellani, supra note 9, p. ix.
72 N.H. Andrews, ‘Reform of Limitation of Actions: The Quest for Sound Policy’, Cambridge Law Journal, Vol.
57, 1998, p. 589. See also Sono, supra note 28, para. V.
73 Sono, supra note 33, pp. 146, paras. 2, 154; Sono, supra note 28, para. I.A.
74 Ostendorf, supra note 16, pp. 32-33, paras. 90-91, 94.
75 See, e.g., s 5(1)(a) Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic)(Australia).
76 s 12(1)(a) Limitation Act (NT)(Australia).
77 Sono, supra note 33, p. 146, para 2; Y. Sugiura, ‘Japan after Acceding to the CISG – Should We Consider
Ratifying the Limitation Convention Next?’, in I. Schwenzer & L. Spagnolo (Eds.), Towards Uniformity,
Eleven International Publishing, The Hague, 2011, p. 229. See also Art. 10.2 Commentary UNIDROIT
Principles 2010, para. 1. Compare Ostendorf, supra note 16, p. 110 n 510; I. Schwenzer & S. Manner, ‘“The
Claim is Time-Barred”: The Proper Limitation Regime for International Sales Contracts in International
Commercial Arbitration’, Arbitration International, Vol. 23, 2007, pp. 297-298.
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case78 a good example of a dispute where a comparatively lengthy (15 year) prescription
period was part of the governing law, and the Noma case79 (applying a one year period)
being illustrative of the other end of the spectrum. In some cases a state’s law might not
enforce any prescription period at all.80 An example here is given by ICC Case No.
7375/1996,81 where the government of Iran argued that Iranian law applied and that Iranian
law did not impose a limitation period on its claims.82
This aspect of divergence has been contested in practice in conflict of laws disputes
before both state courts and arbitral tribunals. In some cases, it has been found that differ-
ences in the potentially applicable state prescription periods would not have affected the
outcome of a case. This was so in ICC Case No. 5460/1987,83 where none of the potentially
applicable prescription periods in issue had expired. Likewise this was true in the Farm
Machines case,84 where a defaulting buyer’s argument based on prescription was rejected.
The real issue was whether the buyer could substantiate its claim that a part payment had
been made; which it could not do on the evidence. In other instances, differing state pre-
scription periods stood to directly affect the outcome of a case.85 In ICC Case No.
7375/199686 – a sales dispute – the four year USA State of Maryland prescription period
would have barred the claim while Iranian law did not impose any period and would have
allowed the Iranian government’s claim to proceed.87 In the English case of Zebrarise Ltd
v. De Nieffe88 – concerning a loan contract – the claim was held to be governed by English
law and barred by the applicable prescription period,89 though Havelock-Allan J also
explained in obiter dicta that Belgian law (the other possibly applicable law) would not
have precluded the claim.90
78 Appellate Court Valencia, Spain, 13 March 2007, Recurso No. 493/2006, available at <http://cisgw3.law.
pace.edu/cases/070313s4.html>.
79 Noma BVBA v. Misa Sud Refrigerazione SpA, Hof van Beroep Ghent, Belgium, 17 May 2004, para. 6.2,
available at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/040517b1.html>.
80 Sono, supra note 28, para. I.A. Compare Art. 10.1 Commentary UNIDROIT Principles 2010, para. 1.
81 International Chamber of Commerce, 1996, Case No. 7375/1996, Mealey’s International Arbitration Report,
Vol. 11, No. 12, p. A-1.
82 Id., p. A-29, para. 218.
83 International Chamber of Commerce, 1988, Case No. 5460/1987, XIII YCA, pp. 106-108, paras. 4-8.
84 Kantonsgericht Nidwalden, Switzerland, 23 May 2005, ZK 04 26, paras. 3.2-3.3 and 5, available at
<http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050523s1.html>.
85 See, generally, C. Croft, C. Kee & J. Waincymer, A Guide to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2013, p. 397, para. 35.6; P. Binder, International Commercial Arbitration and
Conciliation in UNCITRAL Model Law Jurisdictions, 3rd edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2010, p. 336,
para. 6-011. See also M. Blessing, ‘Choice of Substantive Law in International Arbitration’, Journal of Inter-
national Arbitration, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1997, pp. 48-49.
86 ICC Case No. 7375/1996, supra note 81.
87 Id., p. A-29, para. 218.
88 Zebrarise Ltd v. De Nieffe [2004] EWHC 1842, High Court, England and Wales, 21 July 2004.
89 Id., para. 36.
90 Id., para. 43.
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Though time is the most obvious point of difference, state prescription laws also diverge
on many matters other than the length of the prescription period they permit. There are
different approaches to setting the point at which the time period starts to run91 – on the
cause of action’s accrual or on the basis of a discoverability test,92 or a “two-tier” test that
incorporates elements of both.93 The optimal choice between these tests could be influenced
by policy considerations, such as the expectation in commerce that traders will “look after
their interests prudently”, and thus may be context-dependent.94 There are differences in
the way prescription is characterized by legal systems – as substantive law, as procedural
law, or as a combination of the two.95 The approach taken to this question even within a
single legal system may differ over time.96 Different tracks can be taken where proceedings
terminate without an actual decision being rendered on the merits (such as for lack of
jurisdiction), and as to whether the applicable prescription period is suspended, continues
running, or continues running subject to a fixed grace period where this would otherwise
lead to prejudice.97 Still other differences in approach are evident concerning rules for
recommencement of the time period,98 extension of the period,99 and whether parties are
given the autonomy to modify the period of prescription by agreement or not.100 Aside
from the way in which the technical aspects of a prescription period operate, even further
differences arise regarding the consequence of its expiry – specifically, whether it is a
matter that must be affirmatively invoked as a defence or whether it can be considered ex
officio,101 and whether expiry of the permitted time positively extinguishes a party’s rights
or alternatively operates as a bar to their enforcement.102
These differences challenge the prospect of a harmonized solution where the matter
is brought within the scope of an expanded CISG, which would need to provide an effective
resolution to all dimensions of difference. The way in which this resolution might be
91 Sugiura, supra note 77, p. 231; Schwenzer & Manner, supra note 77, p. 298.
92 Andrews, supra note 72, pp. 598-600.
93 Sugiura, supra note 77, p. 232. See also Art. 10.2 Commentary UNIDROIT Principles 2010, paras. 3-4 and
9.
94 Andrews, supra note 72, p. 601.
95 Sono, supra note 33, pp. 147, paras. 4, 151, para. 5; Sono, supra note 28, para. I.A. See also Schwenzer &
Manner, supra note 77, pp. 296-297.
96 See, e.g., McKain v. RW Miller & Co (South Australia) Pty Ltd, supra note 28, p. 41; reversed John Pfeiffer
Pty Ltd v. Rogerson (2000) 203 CLR 503, High Court, Australia, 21 June 2000. See also s 5 Choice of Law
(Limitation Periods) Act 1993 (Vic)(Australia) – and equivalent provisions in the other Australian States
and territories.
97 Sugiura, supra note 77, pp. 232-233.
98 Id., p. 233.
99 Id., pp. 234-235.
100 Id., pp. 235-236. See also Art. 10.3 Commentary UNIDROIT Principles 2010, para. 1.
101 Sugiura, supra note 77, p. 236.
102 Id., pp. 236-237; Art. 10.1 Commentary UNIDROIT Principles 2010, para. 1.
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achieved, perhaps through developing a sense of the international average as an appropriate
“arithmetical compromise”,103 could be a matter for possible future negotiation.
3.3.3 Benefit – The Harmonization Potential of Uniform Law
A third implication of the prescription case study considered by this chapter are the benefits
that might accrue from harmonization in this area of the law. In the face of widely
diverging state laws on prescription, a harmonized solution brought within the scope of
the CISG may stand to generate very real gains for the cause of uniform law, and for
international traders and international trade. It was the divergence between state laws on
prescription that led to the Limitation Period Convention’s “detailed rules” given that
differing state laws offered a solution that was not considered optimal.104 The “consensus”
reached in relation to the existing Limitation Period Convention was in this regard described
as the instrument’s “most remarkable achievement”.105
The rationale for harmonized or uniform law for international commercial matters
lies in transaction costs. The starting point is the belief that international traders desire
certainty.106 This is said to be the case with respect to dispute resolution procedures107
(though procedural flexibility is recognized as a hallmark feature of international commer-
cial arbitration)108 but is particularly said to be so regarding the substantive law governing
the parties’ rights and obligations.109 Differences, and uncertainties, create costs for parties110
– at the time of contracting, and also at the time of dispute resolution. Uniformity is
believed to reduce both of these types of transaction costs,111 thereby promoting interna-
103 Sugiura, supra note 77, pp. 229-230, regarding the four year time period set out under Art. 8 Limitation
Period Convention.
104 Winship, supra note 34, pp. 1075-1076.
105 Sugiura, supra note 77, p. 231; compare p. 238. See also Sono, supra note 28, para. V.
106 Felemegas, supra note 1, pp. 130-131.
107 Compare P. Karrer, ‘Freedom of an Arbitral Tribunal to Conduct Proceedings’, ICC Bulletin, Vol. 10, No.
1, 1999, p. 23, para. 13.4.2.
108 Born, supra note 15, pp. 84-86. See School of International Arbitration, International Arbitration: Corporate
Attitudes and Practices 2006, 2006, available at <http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/docs/123295.pdf>; School
of International Arbitration, International Arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and Practices 2008, 2008, available
at <http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/docs/123294.pdf>. Compare School of International Arbitration,
Corporate Choices in International Arbitration: Industry Perspectives, 2013, available at <http://www.arbitra-
tion.qmul.ac.uk/docs/123282.pdf>.
109 See, e.g., S. Greenberg, ‘The Law Applicable to the Merits in International Arbitration’, Vindobona Journal
of International Commercial Law & Arbitration, Vol. 8, 2004, p. 335.
110 L. Castellani, ‘The Contribution of Uniform Trade Law to Economic Development and Regional Integration
in East Asia and the Pacific: A View from UNCITRAL’, Dong-A Journal of International Business Transactions
Law, Vol. 8, 2012, p. 31.
111 Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, supra note 2, p. 6.
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tional trade and more broadly promoting international economic wellbeing.112 This line
of reasoning underpins the CISG, as reflected in its Preamble.113 It is also the rationale
underpinning other harmonization initiatives relating to international commercial law114
including the Limitation Period Convention.115
It is hard to quantify, in economic terms, the true value of harmonization. It is also not
irrelevant to acknowledge that some authorities have critiqued the value of the CISG’s
harmonization efforts116 on the basis of alleged uncertainties in the instrument,117 and
choice of law patterns revealed by surveys of the case law.118
The view underpinning the existence of UNCITRAL,119 and therefore the very view
sitting behind the CISG,120 is that harmonization is beneficial for international trade. This
chapter does not seek to settle the division of opinion on this matter. Instead, assuming
that the theories given to justify uniform international commercial law are valid, it can be
observed for the purposes of this chapter that growing the CISG by the inclusion of new
legal subject-matters furthers those uniformity goals. Extending the CISG’s subject-matter
scope to include prescription, in light of the currently widely diverging state laws on pre-
scription, may be a particularly ripe area for the realisation of the gains of harmonization.
The realisation of such gains is subject, though, to the interaction that the CISG already
has with the Limitation Period Convention, addressed in Section 3.5 below.
3.3.4 Danger – The CISG’s Relationship with the lex mercatoria
Moving past matters of prospect and potential benefits, the fourth implication raised by
this chapter’s prescription case study introduces danger – the danger posed to the CISG
(by its expansion) to its relationship with the lex mercatoria.
112 ‘Preamble’, in ‘Establishment of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’, GA Res. 2205
(XXI), 17 December 1966, paras. 4-5.
113 Preamble, para. 3, CISG.
114 See, e.g., Preamble, para. 2, Rotterdam Rules.
115 Preamble, para. 2, Limitation Period Convention; Winship, supra note 34, pp. 1074, 1081.
116 Compare Castellani, supra note 9, p. vii.
117 Compare Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, supra note 2, p. 4.
118 See, generally, G. Cuniberti, ‘Is the CISG Benefiting Anybody?’, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law,
Vol. 39, 2006.
119 ‘Preamble’, in ‘Establishment of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’, GA Res. 2205
(XXI), 17 December 1966, paras. 3-5 and 8- 9. See also Felemegas, supra note 1, pp. 124-125.
120 Preamble, para. 3, CISG.
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The “modern”121 or “new”122 lex mercatoria is a highly controversial topic. The literature
addressing the lex mercatoria is described as “very extensive”, and controversy surrounds
its existence, nature and merits.123 The polarising nature of the debate is articulated well
by Craig, Park and Paulsson who explain:
Proponents of lex mercatoria have the disconcerting habit of announcing the
existence of an entire planet on little more evidence than blips on the radar
screen, while detractors have adopted what one might call a posture of aggressive
ignorance. The non-specialist, recoiling instantly from something which he
recognizes as complicated and far removed from his every-day concerns, per-
haps notes the catch-words for possible future reference, and goes on his way.124
Putting these matters to one side, it can be observed that the lex mercatoria is comparatively
less controversial when addressed in the context of its codifications (rather than as the lex
mercatoria at large). Apart from its ordinary application in state court proceedings and
by arbitral tribunals through operation of the Articles 1(1)(a) and 1(1)(b) CISG application
criteria, the CISG is also recognized as reflecting the lex mercatoria.125 Growing the CISG
by expanding its subject-matter scope, particularly in areas like prescription where state
laws vary so widely around the world, brings into question the CISG’s continued recognition
as reflecting the lex mercatoria, or at least the extent to which it remains so recognized.
This is a matter of some importance given that the CISG has a recognized special application
in arbitration,126 and arbitration is a particularly suitable forum for the application of the
lex mercatoria. The former is evidenced (despite only fleeting references to arbitration in
the CISG’s text)127 by 335 of the 432 Chinese CISG cases recorded in the Albert H. Kritzer
121 A. Goldštajn, ‘Usages of Trade and Other Autonomous Rules of International Trade According to the UN
(1980) Sales Convention’, in P. Šarčević & P. Volken (Eds.), International Sale of Goods – Dubrovnik Lectures,
Oceana Publications, New York, 1987, p. 59.
122 M. Mustill, ‘Arbitration: History and Background’, Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1989,
p. 52.
123 ICC Case No. 7375/1996, supra note 81, p. A-39, para. 294.
124 W. Laurence Craig, W.W. Park & J. Paulsson, International Chamber of Commerce Arbitration, Oceana
Publications, New York, 2000, pp. 625-626.
125 See, e.g., International Chamber of Commerce, 1995, Case No. 7331/1994, ICC Bull, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 74-
75; Goldštajn, supra note 121, p. 99. See also International Chamber of Commerce, 1995, Case No. 6149/1990,
XX YCA, p. 56, para. 53; but see pp. 56-57, para. 55. Compare Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, supra note 2, pp.
10-11, para. 4; G. Petrochilos, ‘Arbitration Conflict-of-Laws Rules and the 1980 International Sales Conven-
tion’, Revue Hellenique De Droit International, Vol. 52, 1999, pp. 212-218; M. Davidson, The Lex Mercatoria
in Transnational Arbitration: An Analytical Survey of the 2001 Kluwer International Arbitration Database,
Albert H. Kritzer CISG Database, 2002, available at <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/davidson.html>.
126 G. Bell, ‘Harmonisation of Contract Law in Asia – Harmonising Regionally or Adopting Global Harmonisa-
tions – The Example of the CISG’, Singapore Journal of Legal Studies, 2005, p. 371.
127 Viscasillas & Muñoz, supra note 60, pp. 1355-1356.
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CISG Database as being rendered by CIETAC tribunals.128 The latter is evidenced by the
widespread recognition of “rules of law” in arbitral laws and rules129 which are words
accepted by “coded reference” to include the lex in addition to ordinary national sources
of law.130
There is precedent for the view that a lex-mercatoria-of-prescription might exist. In
ICC Case No. 7375/1996131 the majority opinion held that the parties had implicitly chosen
the lex mercatoria after an implied negative choice of their own home state laws.132 Pre-
scription was a live issue in dispute; after identifying that the lex mercatoria applied, the
resolution of what the lex mercatoria’s contents were regarding prescription was left to a
later stage of the proceedings133 and was thus not reported as part of the Award on Prelim-
inary Issues of 5 June 1996. It would certainly be interesting, in light of the present discus-
sion, to know how chairman Blessing and arbitrators Movahed and Bernardini ultimately
decided this issue – particularly given that the then-relevant first edition UNIDROIT
Principles 1994 did not yet include a prescription chapter.
What can be said, on the basis of the current state of the law, is that expansion of the
CISG’s subject-matter scope creates a genuine danger that the CISG (or at least parts of
it) might no longer be considered to reflect the lex mercatoria. There are specific parts of
the UNIDROIT Principles, such as its hardship provisions,134 that are considered not to
reflect the lex mercatoria, and for that instrument the case law tends to take a case-by-case
approach as to whether this characterization should apply to particular provisions that
arise for consideration.135
128 See, generally, Pace Law School, supra note 3 – confirming a total count of 432 Chinese cases. A search of
the database using the ‘CIETAC’ search term within the ‘Tribunal’ field yields 335 results.
129 See, e.g., Art. 1511 French Arbitration Law 2011; Art. 187(1) Swiss Private International Law Act 1987; Art.
21(1) ICC Rules 2012; Art. 33(1) Swiss Rules of International Arbitration 2012; Art. 35(1) HKIAC Rules
2013; Arts. 27(1) & (2) VIAC Rules 2013; Art. 33(1) ICDR Rules 2014; Art. 22(1) SCC Rules 2010. Compare
Arts. 3-4 and Preamble, para. 13, Rome I Regulation.
130 N. Blackaby et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, 6th edition, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 2015, para. 3.189.
131 ICC Case No. 7375/1996, supra note 81.
132 Id., pp. A-36, para. 283, A-37-A-38, paras. 289-290.
133 Id., pp. A-45-A-47, paras. 343-344 and 348.
134 Arts. 6.2.1-6.2.3 UNIDROIT Principles 2010. See, e.g., International Chamber of Commerce, 2004, Case No.
12446/2004, available at <http://www.unilex.info/case.cfm?pid=1&do=case&id=1424&step=FullText>, citing
E. Jolivet, ‘L’harmonisation du Droit OHADA des Contrats: L’influence des Principles d’UNIDROIT en
Matière de Practique Contractuelle d’Arbitrage’, Uniform Law Review, Vol. 13, 2008, pp. 145-146, n. 44.
135 See, e.g., ICC Case No. 7375/1996, supra note 81, p. A-42, paras. 312 and 314.
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3.3.5 Danger – The CISG’s Relationship with Other International
Instruments
On the subject of the CISG’s external relationships, a further danger of growing the CISG
through an expanded subject-matter scope lies in its interaction with other international
instruments. This is an implication of the CISG’s growth raised by this chapter’s prescription
case study, but is also implicated through any other expansion of the CISG’s subject-matter
scope where an international instrument exists governing those same subject-matter areas
already.
Given that the CISG is not (and was never intended to be) a comprehensive code, it
sits alongside and interacts with a wide variety of other substantive and procedural law
international instruments. It also sits alongside the supplementary application of state law,
as described in Section 3.1 above. The CISG’s expansion does not present particular diffi-
culties in the latter sense, given it is well established that the CISG displaces non-harmonized
state law to the extent of its scope.136 However, the CISG’s relationships with other inter-
national instruments are not resolved on the basis of a single, simple, hard-and-fast rule.
Rather, analysing how those relationships work in practice requires an analysis of the
CISG’s terms as well as the terms of those other instruments.137 International conventions
are more akin to contracts between states rather than centrally imposed legislation;138 thus
it is for the international community of states to itself determine the way in which interna-
tional instruments (including the CISG and other relevant instruments) interact.139 Though
in some cases these kinds of provisions operate on a general level, in others they specifically
implicate the matter of prescription – particularly in instruments addressing private
international law.140
The CISG’s relationships with other international instruments is currently regulated
by specific provisions in the CISG itself as well as those various other instruments, based
136 L. Spagnolo, ‘The Last Outpost: Automatic CISG Opt Outs, Misapplications and the Costs of Ignoring the
Vienna Sales Convention for Australian Lawyers’, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, 2009,
pp. 190-191. See also Schwenzer et al., supra note 2, p. 38, para. 3.23; I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem, ‘Introduction
to Articles 1 – 6’, in I. Schwenzer (Ed.), Schlechtriem & Schwenzer: Commentary on the UN Convention on
the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 3rd edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 19, para. 3.
Contra s 87 Goods Act 1958 (Vic)(Australia); Playcorp Pty Ltd v. Taiyo Kogyo Ltd, Supreme Court of Victoria,
Australia, 24 April 2003, para. 235, available at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030424a2.html>.
137 See, e.g., Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 136, pp. 20-21, para. 6.
138 Compare Q. Wright, ‘The Interpretation of Multilateral Treaties’, AJIL, Vol. 23, 1929, pp. 98-104.
139 For two recent examples – see Preamble, para. 3 and Arts. 1(3), 2(2), 3, 8, 9 and 11 Hague Principles on
Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts; Arts. 3, 6, 7, 8(1), 11 and 13 Common European
Sales Law Regulation (at the time of writing, not yet in force).
140 See, e.g., Art. 12(1)(d) Rome I Regulation; Art. 10(1)(d) Rome Convention. See also Art. 9(1)(d) Hague
Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts; Art. 12(g) Hague Convention 1986 (at
the time of writing, not yet in force). Compare Art. 15(h) Rome II Regulation, concerning the law applicable
to non-contractual obligations.
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on the CISG’s subject-matter scope as presently articulated by Article 4 CISG. The reason
why this implication arises from possible expansion of the CISG is that growth in the
CISG’s subject-matter scope alters the way in which these presently existing interactions
are balanced. In the case of prescription, these alterations would be particularly pronounced.
The reason for this is that the existing UNCITRAL instrument regulating prescription
in the international sale of goods – the Limitation Period Convention – contains a provision
establishing that this Convention “shall not prevail” over international agreements con-
cerning prescription that were already existing, or which may later come into existence.141
It is a rule which has automatic operation, and does not rely on Member States making
any kind of declaration.142 To the extent that state membership of an expanded CISG and
the Limitation Period Convention might overlap, including prescription within the CISG
would render the Limitation Period Convention otiose. This is in a context where significant
efforts (including use of an Amending Protocol) were directed towards ensuring the
compatibility of the CISG and the Limitation Period Convention143 – they are “sister con-
vention[s]”.144 Additionally, although the Limitation Period Convention is sometimes
thought to be “neglected”,145 it has recently been “attracting attention (and treaty actions)”146
and at the 2nd Annual MAA Schlechtriem CISG Conference it was the subject of a call to
arms by Professor Sugiura, particularly addressed to states in the East Asian region.147
The alteration of this balance would also be pronounced so far as the CISG’s relationship
with the UNIDROIT Principles is concerned. Chapter 10, addressing prescription, was
added to the UNIDROIT Principles in 2004 and remains unchanged in the (current)
UNIDROIT Principles 2010. The UNIDROIT Principles envisage their use in particular
contexts, as set out in their Preamble.148 While prescription remains outside the boundaries
set by Article 4 CISG, the UNIDROIT Principles 2010 might usefully be used to “supple-
ment” the Convention through the specific application of their Chapter 10 prescription
rules.149 Should the CISG be expanded to include rules on prescription, the role of the
UNIDROIT Principles 2010 in this kind of case could only amount to one of assistance in
the applicable CISG provisions’ interpretation.150
Expanding the CISG’s subject-matter scope would add further complexity to the
interaction issue because it would not only raise issues as to how an expanded CISG would
141 Art. 37 Limitation Period Convention.
142 Sono, supra note 33, p. 171, para. 3.
143 Winship, supra note 34, pp. 1072-1073, 1078. Compare Sugiura, supra note 77, p. 229.
144 Sono, supra note 28, para. I.A. See also Sugiura, supra note 77, p. 227.
145 R. Sorieul, ‘Foreword’, in I. Schwenzer & L. Spagnolo (Eds.), Towards Uniformity, Eleven International
Publishing, The Hague, 2011, p. 10.
146 Castellani, supra note 9, p. ix.
147 Sugiura, supra note 77, p. 238.
148 See Preamble, paras. 2-6, UNIDROIT Principles 2010.
149 Id., para. 5.
150 Id., para. 5.
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“fit” into existing interaction regimes. It would also raise questions as to how an expanded
CISG would itself regulate those interactions. In particular, it gives rise to a need to consider
how an expanded CISG would deal with the thorny issue of reservations, or other treaty
options.151
Due to the availability of a limited number of reservations under the CISG152 – and
only those reservations153 – there are different “versions” of the CISG in existence.154 The
existence of reservations leads to non-uniformity; however they are “a bittersweet pill to
swallow in that context” as the CISG’s reservation provisions were necessary to initially
secure uniformity through the overall CISG agreement.155
The trend with respect to the CISG as it presently stands has been towards the with-
drawal of existing reservations156 and this is consistent with the recommendations of the
CISG Advisory Council in its recent Declaration No. 2, for which Professor Dr Schroeter
was the rapporteur.157 As the Council notes, the CISG’s existing reservations scheme was
developed on the basis of particular concerns raised by particular states at the time of the
CISG’s original adoption, and thus there is a “weakening (or altogether vanished) need
for the reservations in Articles 92 – 96 CISG”.158 Should the CISG be expanded to include
new subject-matters within its scope, however, the issue of the availability of and provision
for reservations – with respect to an expanded CISG’s (new) “growth provisions” – would
again resurface as part of any (new) negotiations.
151 See, generally, J. Galbraith, ‘Treaty Options: Towards a Behavioral Understanding of Treaty Design’, Va J
Int’l L, Vol. 53, 2013. See also Arts. 2(1)(d) and 19-23 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
152 See Arts. 92-96 CISG. See also Art. 97 CISG.
153 Art. 98 CISG.
154 C. Andersen, ‘Reservations Under the CISG: Regional Trends and Developments’, in I. Schwenzer & L.
Spagnolo (Eds.), Globalization Versus Regionalization, Eleven International Publishing, The Hague, 2013,
p. 1.
155 Id., p. 1.
156 For full discussion, see Chapter 1 by Andersen in this volume. See, e.g., specific withdrawals in countries
such as Lithuania, China, Latvia, Sweden and other nations – United Nations Information Service, Lithuania
Withdraws ‘Written Form’ Declaration Under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (CISG), 4 November 2013, available at <http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/
2013/unisl192.html>; United Nations Information Service, China Withdraws ‘Written Form’ Declaration
Under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 18 January
2013, available at <http://www.unis. unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2013/unisl180.html>; United Nations
Information Service, Latvia Withdraws ‘Written Form’ Declaration Under the United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 15 November 2012, available at <http://www.
unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2012/unisl177.html>; United Nations Information Service, Sweden Becomes
a Party to Part II (Formation of the Contract) of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods (CISG), 1 June 2012, available at <http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/press-
rels/2012/unisl164.html>.
157 CISG Advisory Council, ‘Declaration No. 2 – Use of Reservations Under the CISG’, 2013, Rapporteur: Pro-
fessor Ulrich G. Schroeter. See Recommendation [b]. See also Art. 97(4) CISG; Arts. 22-23 Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties.
158 CISG Advisory Council, supra note 157, para. 1.
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3.3.6 Danger – The Limitations of Treaties as Instruments for the
Harmonization of International Commercial Law
The final implication raised by this paper’s prescription case study is pragmatic. The CISG
is a treaty,159 and expansions to its subject-matter scope could therefore be effected in treaty
form. Treaties are often seen as an ideal form for the unification of private law, though all
of the various forms used for effecting harmonization at the international level have their
own particular advantages and disadvantages, and there are limitations to treaty making.160
Growing the CISG highlights the dangers that might arise from use of the treaty form.
This is once again particularly well illustrated by this chapter’s prescription case study.
One particular danger raised by the treaty form is the difficulty in amending a treaty’s
text. Even outside the amendment context, developing uniform law is difficult;161 the CISG
is a compromise and matters omitted were often omitted for good reason.162 Ironically,
the more successful a treaty (as measured by the number of Contracting States), the greater
difficulty in then effecting change – a point well illustrated by the suggestion that the New
York Convention (with its 156 State Parties)163 is in-practice-unalterable.164 Even where
the agreement necessary to effect treaty amendment is secured, the uniform implementation
of that amendment is not guaranteed. This is illustrated well by the existing Limitation
Period Convention. Despite its Amending Protocol being concluded on 11 April 1980 –
before the Limitation Period Convention itself came into force; and despite the Convention
and the Amending Protocol then both coming into force on the very same day; there is
still inconsistency in their adoption. There are currently 22 State Parties to both the Con-
vention along with its Amending Protocol, but 29 State Parties to just the Limitation Period
Convention as originally concluded.165
Though the CISG’s state membership (at 83 parties)166 is not as extensive as the New
York Convention’s 156 Contracting States, it is similarly recognized as a significant inter-
159 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 1489 UNTS 3. See also
Art. 2(1)(a) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
160 E. Bergsten, ‘Implementation of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration into
National Legislation’, Croatian Arbitration Yearbook, Vol. 10, 2013, p. 104; Paulsson, supra note 68, p. 185.
161 B. Audit, ‘The Vienna Sales Convention and the Lex Mercatoria’, in T. Carbonneau (Ed.), Lex Mercatoria
and Arbitration, Kluwer Law International, Boston, 1998, p. 174.
162 A. Rosett, ‘Critical Reflections on the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods’, Ohio SLJ, Vol. 45, 1984, pp. 281-282.
163 UNCITRAL, Status – Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York,
1958), 2015, available at <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_sta-
tus.html>.
164 M. Kerr, ‘Concord and Conflict in International Arbitration’, Arbitration International, Vol. 13, 1997, p.
143.
165 UNCITRAL, Status – Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods (New York,
1974), 2015, available at <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1974Convention_sta-
tus.html>.
166 UNCITRAL, supra note 21.
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national commercial law success story167 and would be subject to similar difficulty in
amendment. This danger is aggravated in the context of prescription as it is a subject-
matter recognized as “seem[ing] constantly to be going awry”168 and that ideally its regula-
tion should be subject to “regular” review.169 The danger should not be overstated – the
kind of interpretative reviews previously advocated in the United Kingdom, which it was
suggested should involve “regular restatements, made by statutory instrument, which
provide authoritative interpretation of the limitation statute”,170 could possibly find an
analogue in the Opinions or Declarations (or other hypothetical future kinds of activity)
of the CISG Advisory Council.171 Nevertheless, the danger that new prescription provisions
“will quickly silt up” after an expanded CISG has “dredged [prescription’s] channels”172
does remain present. To add to the complexity of this identified danger, it can be recalled
(as discussed in Section 3.2) that existing state prescription laws differ widely, on a number
of measures. Though the policies at issue are broadly consistent between jurisdictions,173
these differences reflect the reality that particular jurisdictions’ laws might have “struck a
different balance”174 in resolving competing policy claims.
Another danger arising from the use of the treaty form is one already familiar to CISG
experience – the risk of a homeward trend interpretation. Despite the interpretative
directives of Article 7(1) CISG,175 cases can be readily identified which equate interpretation
of the CISG with (displaced) domestic principles176 and the homeward trend has been the
subject of sustained academic analysis.177 The Secretariat’s Commentary to the Limitation
Period Convention, in its analysis of the Convention’s equivalent interpretative provision,178
noted the importance of “avoid[ing] different constructions” given the widely differing
approaches taken in non-harmonized state laws.179 Though the Article 7(1) CISG interpre-
167 Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, supra note 2, p. 1. See also M. Van Alstine, ‘Dynamic Treaty Interpretation’,
U Pa LR, Vol. 146, 1997-1998, p. 697.
168 Andrews, supra note 72, p. 607.
169 Id., pp. 608-609.
170 Id., p. 610, para. 11.
171 See, generally, Art. II CISG Advisory Council Bylaws 2013.
172 Compare Andrews, supra note 72, p. 607.
173 See, generally, Singapore Academy of Law, supra note 32, pp. 15-16, para. 47; South African Law Reform
Commission, supra note 32, pp. 11-13, paras. 3.1-3.10; Note, supra note 32, pp. 1185-1186; Brisbane South
Regional Health Authority v. Taylor, supra note 32, pp. 551-553. For an international perspective – see Sono,
supra note 33, p. 146, para. 2.
174 Compare Singapore Academy of Law, supra note 32, p. 16, para. 47. See also Andrews, supra note 72, p. 595.
175 See, generally, Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 6, pp. 122-133, paras. 5-26.
176 See, e.g., Castel Electronics Pty Ltd v. Toshiba Singapore Pte Ltd, Full Federal Court, Australia, 20 April 2011,
available at <http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/110420a2.html>.
177 See, e.g., F. Ferrari, ‘Homeward Trend and Lex Forism Despite Uniform Sales Law’, Vindobona Journal of
International Commercial Law & Arbitration, Vol. 13, 2009.
178 Art. 7 Limitation Period Convention.
179 Sono, supra note 33, p. 154.
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tative directives exist to mitigate homeward trend risks, experience with the CISG to date
demonstrates their operation is not always effective.
3.4 Conclusion
The CISG is sometimes referred to in scholarly writing as having been “concluded in
1980”180 or as having “entered into force in 1988”.181 Both phrases are entirely accurate.
However, at the same time, the CISG is not a static instrument and is also not isolated
from the wider context of which it forms part. Its text, though at present unchanged since
its inception, is subject to development through interpretation by state courts and arbitral
tribunals, and analysis in scholarly commentaries and other forums. It also sits along a
continuum of efforts spanning nearly a century, directed at the harmonization and unifi-
cation of private law. Prescription also has a place in that wider harmonization context.182
The CISG is “a work in progress”, and its broader development within this context helps
it progress.183
Against the context of the Swiss Proposal,184 and also the idea that the CISG might be
grown by the expansion of its subject-matter scope, this chapter has used the case study
of prescription to assess the prospects, benefits and dangers associated with such expansion.
This analysis has considered six implications evident within the single subject-matter of
prescription. These are not exhaustive, and may not be representative. However, the
implications raised by prescription provide examples of all three of an expansion program’s
prospect, benefits and dangers. For this reason, the case study of prescription is a useful
example upon which to reflect, when considering the CISG’s growth in general (including
also its adoption by new Member States and its usage in particular industry sectors).
The CISG’s text remains, to date, unchanged. However as the contributions made in
this volume in honour of Professor Dr Schlechtriem show, it is nevertheless a dynamic,
evolving and relevant instrument whose “growth” is eminently deserving of attention,
considered analysis and debate.
180 See, e.g., A. Drettmann, Would English Law on Trade Usages Benefit from Adopting a More Formal Approach
Such as Seen in Other Jurisdictions as Well as in International Conventions?, Albert H. Kritzer CISG Database,
2009, available at <http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/drettmann.html>.
181 See, e.g., M. Shulman & L. Singh, ‘China’s Implementation of the UN Sales Convention Through Arbitral
Tribunals’, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 48, 2010, p. 270.
182 Sono, supra note 28, para. V.
183 Castellani, supra note 9, p. x.
184 UNCITRAL Secretariat, supra note 10, Ann. 1.
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